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ABSTRACT 
This paper constructs a very simple model to investigate the effects of
the intergenerational distribution of rents on saving, growth and fiscal
policy. The rents in this model are generated from an investment externality.
We consider a model in which the population grows at a constant rate, with new
generations unrelated to previous ones. The model considered can have
sustained growth in output per capita or can converge to a steady-state,
depending on parameter values. The distribution of rents between labor and
owners of firms affects the rate of growth in both cases. 
In searching for explanations of the productivity slowdown in the U.S. in 
recent decades, Romer (1987) notes that there appears to be a large difference 
between the effects on output of adding a unit of capital (or labor), and 
capital's (or labor's) share in national income. The returns to factors do 
not reflect their marginal productivity, but instead may largely be determined 
by the share of external rents captured by the factors. The implications of 
various investment externalities for growth have, of course, been studied in 
great detail in recent years. However, we argue that the distribution of 
rents per se will have important effects in determining the growth path of the 
economy. In turn, the potential tradeoffs between growth and distributional 
goals are paramount in fiscal policy decisions. Indeed, the history of fiscal 
policy in the U.S. in the 1980s and 1990s appears to be one predicated on the 
conflict between groups trying to maintain their economic status in the face 
of real changes in the economy. Important changes in budgetary and tax policy 
have evolved in response to shocks to the economy which have led to a 
redistribution of returns to various groups. But there is a strong 
interdependence between the distributional goals of fiscal policy and the 
dynamic goals for saving, investment and growth. 
The recent literature (Romer (1986, 1987), Grossman and Helpman (1991), 
for example) provides a useful starting point for investigating these issues. 
It has suggested that there are important external effects of investment. For 
example, if one firm increases expenditure on research and development, it is 
unlikely to be able to capture fully the social benefit of that investment. 
There is likely to be a positive spillover to other firms in the industry and 
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in other sectors of the economy. Our focus is on the rents derived from the 
spillovers. In the absence of first-order debt neutrality, the distribution 
of the rents have an influence on the dynamic behavior of the economy. The 
level of aggregate consumption and the rates of capital accumulation and 
income growth depend on how the external rents are distributed. 
In this paper, we will demonstrate in a simple example economy how the 
distribution affects these macro aggregates over time, and how the effects of 
fiscal policy depend on the distribution of the rents. Our goal in part is to 
develop a set of predictions from the model that might be tested, and would 
ultimately refine our understanding of the nature of economic growth. 
In the existing literature, there has been little focus on the 
distributional effects of the growth externality. The bulk of the literature 
is set in a context of a single representative consumer. It is irrelevant in 
that type of model how the external rents are distributed. More recently, 
Saint-Paul (1992) and Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1991) have examined 
overlapping-generations models with investment externalities, but ones in 
which all of the external rents accrue to labor. Thus, the distribution issue 
does not arise in their models by assumption. 
Perotti (1990) and Persson and Tabellini (1991) have looked at the effect 
of the intragenerational size distribution of income on growth. Alesina and 
Rodrik (1991) and Bertola (1991) have focused on the intragenerational 
distribution of factor rewards. In contrast, we study the intergenerational 
distribution of external rents. 
The extent to which each group captures these rents will decide the 
choice of fiscal policy for a government maximizing some social welfare 
function. In the presence of an investment externality such as the one 
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described, a Pigouvian subsidy to investment can lead to a Pareto improvement 
in welfare. Even with such a subsidy in place, the government may wish to 
pursue goals that involve redistribution across generations. 1 Many of the 
issues that are raised in public debate concerning fiscal policy are not 
matters that involve policies that raise everybody's welfare. A policy that 
raises national saving usually redistributes from current (particularly older) 
generations towards future generations. 
I. The Model 
The model used in this paper is an overlapping generations of the Weil 
(1989) type. There is constant proportional population growth. Individuals 
have infinite horizons, and perfect foresight. All agents are endowed with 
identical human capital when they are born, and they have identical 
preferences. We aggregate the equations describing the behavior of optimizing 
individuals to obtain the dynamic behavior of the economy. (This contrasts 
with the older literature on optimal growth models with population growth, 
which studied the path for the economy when a social planner maximized per 
capita utility.) It is assumed that no individual's welfare depends directly 
on the utility of any other individual (i.e., no operative bequest motive). 
This type of model shares many of the characteristics of other 
overlapping generations models. (In fact, algebraically, it is essentially 
identical to the Blanchard (1985) model.) In particular, the timing of lump­
sum taxes matters. If taxes are deferred to later, unborn generations will 
1 In the model we use, lump-sum redistributive fiscal policy cannot, in 
itself, improve everybody's welfare. 
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bear a larger share. Thus, government surpluses and deficits redistribute the 
tax burden between generations. Indeed, Buiter and Kletzer (1990) have shown 
that in overlapping-generations models any equilibrium generated by a 
particular sequence of budget deficits (or surpluses) and age dependent lump­
sum taxes or transfers can be replicated by some other sequence of budget 
deficits (or surpluses) and only age independent lump-sum taxes or transfers. 
In this section, we will begin by describing the consumers' optimization 
problems. Then, we will turn to the firm. Finally, we will set up the 
dynamic model in terms of aggregates. 
Our notation convention in this paper is that variables pertaining to 
individual consumers or firms are in small letters, aggregate variables are in 
capital letters with a~ over them, and aggregate per capita variables are in 
capital letters. 
Consumers 
Individuals are assumed to have logarithmic utility and maximize utility 
over an infinite horizon. The dynamic budget constraint faced by an 
individual at time t who was born at time vis 
a(v,t) = r·a(v,t) + w(t) - T(t) - c(v,t). 





Finally, we assume that a(v,v) = 0. 
In the above equations, a(v,t) is the assets held by the individual at 
time t, and c(v,t) is her consumption. w(t) is the wage paid at time t. Note 
that it is independent of the individual's age. T(t) are lump-sum taxes (or 
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transfers if negative). We also assume that these are independent of age. 
Given the result of Buiter and Kletzer cited above, we do not lose any 
generality by considering only age-independent taxes and transfers, as long as 
we allow government budget deficits that satisfy the conventional solvency 
constraint. Furthermore, we assume w(t) - T(t) ~ 0. Finally, note that we 
treat the interest rate, r, as a constant. It will turn out that given our 
assumptions about firms' technology, the interest rate will always be 
constant. 
It is easy to show that the optimal consumption choice is given by 
c(v,t) = o[a(v,t) + h(t)], 
where 
oo -r(s-t)h(t) = J [w(s)-T(s)]e ds, 
t 
and o is the rate of time preference. 
A crucial assumption in this framework is that agents cannot trade claims 
to human capital. We will make a distinction between assets which can be 
traded (equity, bonds and capital) and those that cannot (human capital). 
We assumer> o throughout. Otherwise, in equilibrium consumers will 
just consume their labor income and never save. This is an uninteresting 
case. 
Firms 
Turning to the firm, we assume a very specific production function. We 
have that the output of firm j at time tis given by 
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In this equation, y(j,t) refers to output by firm j at time t, k(j,t) is 
that firm's capital input, and t(j,t) is that firm's labor input. K(t) is the 
aggregate capital stock, and L(t) is the population at time t. (It is assumed 
.
that labor is inelastically supplied.) Note that the parameter w is different 
than the wage rate, w(t). 
The production function is obviously a very special one. We chose this 
function because it yields an analytically tractable economic system, while 
capturing all of the essential elements of the problem we are interested in. 
The most important aspects of this function arise from our assumption that 
there are a constant number of firms in this economy, normalized to equal one. 
We are assuming, then, that there is some specific factor which is available 
to the firm and is not reproducible. Hence, the firm will have a positive 
value (more on this in just a moment). In equilibrium,' since all firms are 
identical, we have k(j,t) = K(t), and t(j,t) = L(t). This implies that there 
is ~n aggregate production function given by 9K(t) + wL(t). The linearity of 
the aggregate function ensures that the real interest rate is constant over 
time. 
This production function captures the notion that there is a positive 
externality to greater investment by the firm. The social marginal product of 
capital is 9, but the private marginal product is less than 9. 
Labor's private marginal product is greater than its social marginal 
product, w. The share of the externality that falls to labor (as opposed to 
owners of the firm) is measured by the parameter~. The larger is~. the 
greater the payment to labor. 
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A useful way to highlight some key features of our production function is 
to contrast it to the one considered by Saint-Paul (1992) and Alogoskoufis and 
van der Ploeg (1991). They have~= 1, and w = 0. Their first assumption 
implies that labor captures all of the external benefits from the investment 
externality. Since we argue that the interesting thing about fiscal policy in 
a model with investment externalities arises from the distributional effects 
of the externality, we clearly do not want~ to equal one. We assume w * 0 
because otherwise individuals' net worth at birth would be non-zero only 
because of the investment externality. If we were to consider the case in 
which all the rents accrue to owners of the firm, and insisted on setting w=O, 
then the: model would ha:v:e.-the ,.uncomfortable- feature that ,individuals have no 
income, and thus can never save or consume. 
The share of the externality that accrues to owners of the firm is given 
by 1-~. Note that the firm would have no value were it not for the 
externality. One might wish to think of firms having property rights that 
allow them to exploit the externality. It would be simple enough to enter a 
linear term as we did f,or labor, so that there is a positive social return to 
a specific factor such as land. However, this would make the aggregate model 
very difficult to analyze, unless the function were linear in the quantity of 
the specific factor endowed to each firm divided by population. Such a 




harm done in assuming the social marginal product of the specific factor is 
zero (as opposed to the analogous assumption for labor). 
The firm chooses the capital stock and the labor input to maximize 
profits each period. There are no costs to installing capital, so the firm 
will set the marginal product of capital equal to the rental rate: 
eakCj,t) 0- 1tCj,t)(l-a)~K(t) 1- 0[Ct)-(l-a)~ = r - p. 
Here, pis the per unit of capital subsidy from the government, and is the 
only distortionary tax or subsidy in the model. In product market 
equilibrium, the above condition reduces to 
Ba= r -p. 
The condition that the marginal product of labor equal the wage rate is 
given in equilibrium by: 
e~(l-a)K(t) + w = w(t). 
Note that this equation uses the aggregate per capita capital stock, K(t). 
The stream of dividend payments for this firm are given by the value of 
output less the cost of factor payments (plus the subsidy to capital). 
Letting the price of the good be unity, we find in equilibrium that dividend 
payments are given by 0(1-0 )(1-~)K(t). 
It is interesting to observe the factors that affect wages and dividends, 
given the capital stock. First, wages and dividends are higher the higher is 
the externality (the greater is l-0 ). Second, wages are higher and dividends 
lower the greater is~- Note that dividends would be zero either if there 
were no externality (0=1) or all the rents went to labor (~=1). 
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Financial Market Equilibrium 
Before examining the aggregate system, we consider the financial market. 
Because all individuals have perfect foresight, all assets must pay the same 
rate of return. This implies that the return on government debt must equal 
the rental rate of capital, r. 
It also means that the return to holding equities must equal r. The rate 
of return for equities is given by 
r = q(t)/q(t) + 0(1-~)(l-0 )K(t)/q(t) - P(t)/q(t). 
In this expression, q represents the price per share. We assume there is one 
share per firm. Along with the assumption of the representative firm, q can 
be seen to also equal the aggregate value of shares. Non-distortionary taxes 
on dividends are given by P(t). So, we have that the capital gains rate plus 
the flow of dividends per share equals the interest rate. 
We will assume dividends are always non-negative. That is, 
PCtl ~ ec1-~)Cl-alKCtl. 
Aggregate Values 
We assume that population grows at the constant rate n. It is 
straightforward to aggregate as in Weil (1989). We will leave the details to 
the reader. 
Aggregate accumulation per capita of tradeable assets is given by 
A(t) = (00+p-n)A(t) + w(t) - T(t) - C(t). 
Recall that the interest rate, r, equals e0 +p. 
We have that A(t) = K(t) + q(t) + D(t). K(t) is the aggregate per capita 
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capital stock, q(t) is the aggregate per capita value of shares, and D(t) is 
the aggregate per capita government debt. 
Consumption evolves according to 
C(t) = (00+p-o)C(t) - onK(t) - onq(t) - onD(t). 
The evolution of equity prices is given by: 
q(t) = (00+p-n)q(t) - 0(1-o)(l-~)K(t) + P(t). 
The government budget constraint is given by: 
D(t) = (p+00-n)D(t) + pK(t) - T(t). 
T(t) is the sum of the two types of non-distortionary taxes: T(t) = T(t) + 
P(t). The equation says that accumulation of debt equals interest payments on 
the debt (recalling r = p + 00), plus subsidies to firm's for renting capital 
(pK(t)) less non-distortionary taxes. We also impose the government solvency 
constraint: 
lim D(t)e-(r-n)t = 0. 
t-¾3 
Taking the equations for q(t) and D(t) and subtracting them from the 
equation for A(t) (and using the fact that w(t) = 0~(l-0 )K(t) + w) havewe 
K(t) = (0-n)K(t) - C + w. 
The four equations for K(t), D(t), q(t) and C(t) constitute a four 
equation dynamic system. However, the system is not complete until the fiscal 
policy choice is specified. A path for total non-distortionary taxes, T(t), 
and for the amount of non-distortionary taxes that falls on dividends, P(t), 
must be specified before the system is closed. In the next two sections we 
will examine the model under several different assumptions about fiscal 
policy. The variables K(t), D(t), q(t) and C(t) will constitute state 
variables under all the fiscal policy regimes we consider. For now, notice 
that the K(t) and C(t) equations are not affected by the values for T(t) and 
p ( t). 
II. The Laissez-Faire Economy 
In this section, we will analyze the model when there are no taxes, no 
transfers, and no government debt -- a laissez-faire government. We are 
interested in characterizing how capital accumulation and consumption are 
affected by the distribution of rents and by the size of the externality. 
When p, P(t), T(t), r(t) and D(t) all equal zero at all times, the 
dynamic system can be written: 
cCtl er-o -on -on C(t) 0 
ictJ = -1 e-n 0 K(t) + w 
q(t) o -e Cl-r) (1 -11) er-n q ( t ) 0 
Recall that we are only examining the interesting case of 00-0 > 0. 
A. The Effects of Rent Distribution 
In this model, because labor is supplied inelastically and the number of 
firms is fixed, the share of rents accruing to each recipient does not affect 
any factor supply or factor demand decision. It only affects the supply of 
wealth across generations. The larger the share of rents that go to labor, 
the smaller the wealth of currently alive generations. When rents accrue to 
labor, future generations will capture some of those rents, but when rents 
accrue to firms they are captured by the current owners of the firm. 
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We will compare two economies in which the share of rents going to labor 
differ. Each economy has the same initial capital stock. In one economy, all 
rents are earned by labor2: ~ = 1. In the comparison economy, infinitesimally 
less of the rents accrue to labor, and go to firms instead. The choice of~= 
1 as the benchmark economy is made because it simplifies the algebra, and is 
not critical for any of our conclusions. 
There are three state variables which describe the path of the economy. 
K{t) is predetermined, while C(t) and q(t) are not. Consumption and the value 
of firms can jump to place the economy on the saddle path. There need not be 
convergence to the steady state. The economy proceeds along the saddle path 
in both the stable and unstable cases. When all roots are positive, the 
economy is on the unstable saddle path. The fact that the unstable solution 
is feasible does not arise because of the overlapping generations nature of 
the model, or because of the externality. It is because the aggregate 
production function is linear. Even in the representative agent version of 
this model with no externality, the optimal path could be divergent, and 
capital and labor could grow indefinitely.3 This is the case of sustained 
growth that has received considerable attention in the new growth literature. 
We will assume that the interest rate is less than the long run growth 
rate. This assumption insures that the price of equities is always positive. 
In the stable case, the long-run growth rate of aggregate output is n, so the 
assumption implies 0~ > n. We actually need a stronger restriction on the 
parameter space than this in the unstable case because the economy grows at 
2 As in the papers of Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg (1991) and Saint-
Paul (1992). 
3 The model of Jones and Manuelli (1990) is one that emphasizes the role
of non-concavity in production as a source for sustained growth. 
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the rate A+n, where A is the value of the smallest of the characteristic roots 
of the dynamic system. Hence, we will need that 00-n-A > 0. 
Our strategy will be to examine the economy near the point where n = 1. 
This is convenient, because when n = 1, q = o., and dynamic system is only 2x2 
(two state variables, Kand C, and two dynamic equations). So, we will end up 
dC(t) dK(t)
evaluating derivatives like and --- from the 3x3 system evaluated at 
ctn ctn 
n = 1. The assumption that 00-n-A > 0 is accomplished in this case when 
on+e(o-n)(l-a) > o. 
The steady-state values of K(t), C(t) and q(t) are denoted K, C and q. 








The product of the characteristic roots (given by the determinant of the 
matrix in equation (1)) is equal to minus the denominator of each of the 
expressions for the steady-state values. Thus, when the system is saddle-path 
stable (one negative root and two positive), all of the variables are positive 
in steady state. When all roots are positive (the sustained growth case) then 
all the variables are negative in steady state. 
The change in the steady-state values for a change inn are given by: 
dK 









When~= 1, the term in brackets in the numerator of is equal to minus the 
d~ 
product of the eigenvalues of the 2x2 system. Thus, in the stable case 
dq dq 
< 0, and in the unstable case > 0. We will only need to evaluate this 
derivative when~= 1. 
There are an infinite number of dynamic paths that solve equation (1). 
Only one path (in the stable and unstable cases) satisfies the feasibility 
conditions for the economy that K(t) and C(t) remain positive in all time 
periods. Along this path, the variables converge to the steady state at a 
rate given by A, the negative eigenvalue, if the system is stable. If it is 
unstable they diverge from the steady state at the rate A, the smaller of the 
positive roots in the 2x2 system.4 We have then, that K = A(K(t)-K), or 
A(K(t)-K) = -(C(t)-C) + (0-n)(K(t)-K) + w. 
dC dK 
Differentiating (and using the fact that = (9-n)-), we have 
d~ d~ 
dC(t) dK _ dA 
(2) = A- - (K(t)-K)-. 
d~ d~ d~ 
4 This is the path that satisfies the conditions: lim K(t) ~ 0, and 
t-¾:> 
lim K(t)e-(e-n)t ~ 0 (which comes from integrating the equation of motion for 
t-¾:> 
the aggregate capital stock and imposing a boundary condition). These are 
necessary for a feasible infinite horizon consumption stream. 
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We need to evaluate The characteristic polynomial for the system 
given by equation (1) is: 
Setting P equal to zero and differentiating allows us to calculate 
d;:\ 
d71' 
evaluating the derivative at 71=1. (Note that when 71=1, (00-o-;:\)(0-n-;:\) =on.) 
d;:\ one Cl-a) 
---------- > 0. 
Cea-n-;:\)[e-n+ea-o-2;:\] 
The sign of this derivative is the positive. From investigation of the 
polynomial Pone can determine that;:\< 0-o, recalling assumption thatso our 
0a-n-;:\ > 0, the denominator is the product of two positive numbers. 
dC(t)
We can see from equation (2) that the largest --- can be is when 
d71 
K(t) = 0, because 
d;:\ 
> 0. This is true in both the convergent and divergent
d71 
cases. When K(t) = 0 (and evaluating the derivative at 71=1): 
dC(t) = one Cl-al Cea-o)w[ ;:\ 1 ] 
e(o+na-ea) e(o+na-Ba)Cea-n) + Cea-n-;:\)(e-n+ea-o-2;:\) 
-one(l-a)Cea-o)w[ rr+ea-n-;:\ ]
= -------- ---------- < 0. 
rr rr(ea-n)(ea-n-;:\)(rr-;:\) 
In this expression, rr > 0 is the largest eigenvalue of the 2x2 system when 
dC(t)
11 = 1. The largest value of is negative. 
d71 
So, when more rents accrue to equity owners (71 falls below 1), currently 
living generations are able to capture more of the rents. The value of all 
future rents that will be paid to owners of equities are capitalized in the 
current price of equities. The wealth of the current generations is higher 
when equity holders receive some rents, and their consumption will be larger. 
Comparing this economy to a benchmark economy with the same initial capital 
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stock (therefore the same output), an increase in the share of rents accruing 
to equity holders lowers saving. 
In the stable economy capital accumulation will be lower, and the long­
run levels of the capital stock and consumption will be lower. The initial 
consumption is higher in the economy in which some rents accrue to equity 
holders, but eventually aggregate consumption falls below what it would be in 
the economy with ~=1. 
In the unstable economy, growth will proceed at a slower rate in the 
economy in which~ is lower (rents to labor are lower) because the per capita 
capital stock and consumption are diverging from steady state at rate A,a 
which rises with~- Initial consumption is higher, but again, it must 
eventually fall below that of the economy with ~=1. 
We also have that q = A(q(t)-q), so that 
A(q(t)-q) = (0o-n)(q(t)-q) - 0(1-o)(l-~)(K(t)-K). 
Totally differentiating, we have: 
Evaluating the change in q at ~=1, the last two terms in the previous 
equation drop out, so that we have 
dq(t) dq e Cl-a) -(3) = ---(K(t)-K). 
d~ d~ Ba-n-A 
dq(t)
This equation implies that --- achieves its largest value when K(t)
d~ 
equals zero, whether the economy is stable or not. In this case (evaluated at 
~=1) 
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= < 0. 
d~ rr(0o-n)(0o-n-A) 
So, as~ falls slightly below 1, q rises. In the benchmark economy, q = 0, 
because there is no return to holding equities. Hence, in the comparison 
economy, q will be higher than in the benchmark economy. 
To summarize both the convergent and divergent cases, when more rents 
accrue to firm owners, non-human wealth of current generations (K+q) is 
greater, because q is greater. Therefore, current consumption will be higher. 
Since the distribution of rents does not affect aggregate output (= 0K + wL), 
saving will be lower as equity's share of rents rise. Hence, capital 
accumulation and growth will be smaller. 
Thus, the growth rate of the economy depends on how rents are 
distributed. In the stable case, the steady state level of capital and 
consumption will be lower when labor's share of rents is smaller, while in the 
unstable case the permanent growth rate.will be smaller. 
B. Effects of the Externality on Growth 
Now we will discuss the effects of the externality itself on growth. 
This model is not very different from many other models with investment 
externalities, except for the fact that the economy moves along a saddle path 
which could be either convergent or divergent. 
We will consider the effects of small externalities. So, we will compare 
an economy in which there is no externality (o=l) to one in which r is 
slightly smaller than one. In our economy, there are constant returns to 
scale in the aggregate, no matter what the value of 0 . A decrease in 0 
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--------
represents not only a greater externality, but a lower private marginal 
product of capital as well. We are comparing economies that have the same 
aggregate technology and the same initial capital stock. We ask how 
differently the economies behave when externalities are relatively more 
important. 
From the expressions for the steady state, (and evaluating the 
derivatives at r=l), we have: 
dK won Cl -11) on ( e-o) w 
= + > 0. 
ctr e(o+n-e) 2 e(e-n)(o+n-e) 2 
dC dK 




When o = 1, the roots are e, e-n-o and 0-n. In the stable case, e-n-o < 0, 
dq dq
and < 0. In the unstable case, > 0. 
do ctr 
Analogous to our derivation of equation (2) is the derivation of 
dC(t) dK - di\ 
= i\.- - (K(t)-K)-. 
do ctr do 
Differentiating the characteristic polynomial, and evaluating the 
derivative for r = 1 we get: 
di\ e(o+nCl-11)) 
= > 0. 
ctr o+n 
dC(t)
The largest that can be when r=l is when K(t) = 0. This is true 
ctr 
irrespective of the sign of i\. = e-n-o. When K(t) = 0, havewe 
dC(t) = -[wo(n+e) w(e+o)n(e-o)(l-11)]+ -------- < 0. 
do o+n e (e-n) (o+n) 
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dC(t)
Since is negative at its maximum, it is always negative.
do 
So, when the private marginal product of capital is lower, current 
consumption is higher. Saving is lower (because the change in O does not 
affect the aggregate level of output), and capital accumulation is lower. The 
stable economy converges to a smaller capital stock and consumption level, 
while the unstable economy grows continuously at a lower rate. 
By following the same steps to derive equation (3), we can get 
-dq(t) dq 0 (1-71) -
= --(K(t)-K).
do 0 
This derivative is largest in either the convergent or divergent case when 
dq(t) dq(t)K(t) = 0. In that case, = 0. When K(t) > 0, > 0, except when 11 =
do do
dq(t)
1 (in which case, = 0).
do 
Hence, a greater externality must increase q if 11 < 1. That is simply 
because the greater the externality, the higher the rents earned by equity 
holders. 
III. Fiscal Policies 
The Pigouvian subsidy to capital sets p = 0(1-0 ). This subsidy makes the 
rental rate on capital, r, equal to the social opportunity cost of capital, 0. 
When the Pigouvian subsidy is in place, the economy is at a Pareto optimum. 5 
5 In this overlapping generations model, a dynamically inefficient
equilibrium is not possible because of the linear technology. 
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A. Taxes and Deficits 
The dynamic effects of a subsidy depend upon the exact way that the 
government finances the subsidy. Options for the government include borrowing 
from the public, or raising non-distortionary taxes. There are two types of 
non-distortionary taxes available to the government: lump-sum taxes on 
consumers, or taxes on rents of the firms. 
We will consider the following policy for non-distortionary taxes: 
T(t) = ~K(t) + Z, 
where Z is constant. It is important to emphasize that even though the total 
amount of taxes collected (or subsidies paid, if T(t) is negative) depends on 
the aggregate capital stock, these taxes are levied as lump-sum taxes. 
With this tax policy, the dynamic path for debt is given by: 
D(t) = (p+re-n)D(t) + (p-~)K(t) - z. 
We will also assume that the amount of taxes levied on rents of firms, 
P(t), is given by: 
P(t) = a::K(t) + C. 
where c is a constant. Recalling that T(t) = P(t) + T(t), the amount of lump­
sum taxes levied on consumers, T(t), is given by: 
We now have that the value of equities evolves according to: 
q(t) = (p+r0-n)q(t) + (~-0(1-r)(l-~))K(t) + c. 
Define "financial wealth", F(t), by F(t) s D(t) + q(t). We have: 
F(t) = (p+re-n)F(t) + (p+~-~-0(1-r)(l-~))K(t) + c-Z. 
We have chosen the policies for non-distortionary taxes in a way that the 
dynamics of the economy can be described with three state variables and three 
dynamic equations. As we shall see, this set of fiscal policies is special in 
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the sense that it allows the government to arrive at any desired distribution 
of the external rents. 
The dynamic system for the economy is: 
cct) p+ea-o -on -on C(t) 0 
(4) KCt) = -1 0-n 0 K(t) + w 
0 p+a-~-0(1-a)Cl-~) p+er-n F(t) c-Z
FCt) 
We can now make the following observation about the economy when the 
Pigouvian tax is imposed. 
Observation 1: When the Pigouvian tax, p = 0(1-0 ), is imposed, and when 
p+a-~-0(1-r)(l-~) = 0 and c-Z = 0, the path for aggregate consumption and 
capital will be the same as the laissez-faire economy with the same aggregate 
production function and no externality (0=1). 
Under the conditions stated in the observation, F(t) = 0 for all t. 
Although q(t) and D(t) need not be zero, the paths of C(t) and K(t) are 
independent of q and D, and are determined by: 
C(t) = ce-o)C(t) - onKCt) 
K(t) = -C(t) + (0-n)K(t) + w. 
These are also the dynamic equations for the economy with no externality (so 
the aggregate production function is given by 0K(t) + wL(t), which is 
identical to the production function of the representative firm), and no 
government intervention. 
We can also see from examination of equation (4) that the equations for 
the evolution of consumption and the capital stock are not directly affected 
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by the share of rents going to labor, ~. the parameter governing the behavior 
of total non-distortionary taxes,~. or the parameter determining the share of 
non-distortionary taxes that are levied on rents paid to firms, a. We can 
therefore state: 
Observation g: A larger value of a or a smaller value of~ has the exact same 
effect on the path for the economy as a smaller value of~-
This follows from examination of equation (4), noting that a, ~and~ appear 
only as coefficients on K(t) in the equation for F(t). A larger a or a 
smaller~ leads to the same behavior as a larger~- Because C, Kand Fare 
state variables for this system, the specified changes in a, ~and~ have the 
same effect on all variables in the economy. 
The intuition of this result is as follows. A greater value of a simply 
implies that the rents for equity holders are being taxed at a greater rate. 
This has the same effect as if the external rents accruing to owners of 
equities in the laissez-faire economy were lower. 
A greater value of~ implies that taxes are being shifted more toward 
future generations. The current debt of the government must be lower with the 
government's solvency constraint imposed. Since future generations bear more 
of the tax burden, the currently alive are better off, just as if they were 
receiving a greater share of external rents. 
Tax collection policies that depend upon the aggregate capital stock 
allow us to change the parameters the fiscal policies used, to mimic the 
distributional effects of the external rents. In contrast, changes inc and Z 
cannot completely offset the effects of a change in~ on the dynamic system. 
22 
B. Dynamic Effects of Budgetary Policies 
In this section, we will examine the effects of higher tax collections 
and of shifting more of the tax burden on to owners of firms. 
We will assume the Pigouvian subsidy is in place, so that p = 0(1-0 ). 
All changes in lump-sum tax policies will not effect efficiency, only 
intertemporal distribution. 
We will also assume that c and Z are zero, so that total non­
distortionary taxes are given by T(t) = ~K(t), and the amount of taxes imposed 
on rents of firms is P(t) = aK(t). We assume that a~ 0(1-0 )(1-~), so that 
after-tax rents are never negative. 
We will compare two economies with different tax policies. Define 
r = a-~+8~(1-0 ). In the benchmark economy, r = 0. In the comparison economy, 
r is slightly less than 0, either because the economy collects more taxes in 
total (higher~), or because the burden of taxes falls less heavily on owners 
of firms (smaller a). 
The dynamic system for the economy can be represented simply as: 
cct) e-o -on -on C(t) 0 
ict) = -1 8-n O K(t) + w 
fret) 
0 r e-n F(t) 0 












We will consider how a change in r affects the dynamic path of the 
economy. That will allow us to compare the benchmark economy and the 
comparison economy, assuming they have the same initial capital stock but 
different tax policy parameters, a and~-
The effect of a change in r on the steady state (evaluating the 
derivatives at r = 0) is given by: 
dK on(e-o) (e-n)w 





d11 2[e(o+n-e) (e-n)] 
Analogous to equation (2) above, we have: 
dC(t) dK _ dA 
A- - (K(t)-K)-. 
ctr ctr ctr 
dC(t) dA
To evaluate this expression for we calculate - evaluated at r = 0 
df ctr 
(when r = 0, A= e-o-n.), to get: 
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= > 0. 
ctr o+n 
d;\. dC(t)
Because > 0, is largest when K(t) is zero -- in either the
ctr ctr 
convergent or divergent case. Then, 
dC(t) -(0+0)(0-o)nw 
---------- < 0. ctr (o+n)e2 (0-n) 
dC(t)
So, even at its largest, is negative.
ctr 
We also have, following the derivation of (3), that 
dF(t) dF 1 _ 
a: --(K(t)-K).
ctr ctr o 
This derivative is largest when K(t) a: 0. In this case 
dF ( t ) - (0-o )w 
;: ---- < 0. 
ctr 00(0-n) 
We conclude that in the comparison economy with a lower value of r, 
initial consumption and the initial value of financial assets are greater than 
in the benchmark economy. 
A lower value of r implies that a higher share of the tax burden will 
fall on future generations, either because~ is greater or a is lower. Thus, 
the current generations are wealthier, which means that their consumption is 
higher. Saving in the economy will be lower. In the stable case, the economy 
with the lower value of r will converge to a lower capital stock, and a lower 
steady-state consumption. In the unstable case, the rate of growth of per 
capita income,;\., will be lower. 
If we let the benchmark economy be one where both debt and the value of 
firms is zero (so~ a: 0(1-r) and a a: 0(1-r)(l-~)), then if the benchmark 
economy had a higher total tax rate (a higher~). it would also have a greater 
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initial debt. So, if we compare two economies with the same capital stock at 
time t, the one that has been running larger budget deficits and has a higher 
government debt will have greater current consumption. However, in the stable 
case its long-run capital stock and consumption will be lower, and in both 
cases, its growth rate will be lower. 
Interestingly, an economy which places a smaller share of the tax burden 
on firm-owners, (a smaller a) will replicate the consumption and capital 
accumulation paths of the economy with higher initial debt and higher~- In 
this case, the lower value of a will increase the value of firms, thus 
encouraging current consumption and discouraging saving. 
Neither of the fiscal policies discussed in this section are 
distortionary. They,have no direct effects on factor supplies or factor 
demands, nor do they alter current output. Their effects are distributional. 
But, by changing the distribution of income across generations, they change 
the growth path. 
IV. Conclusions 
We have seen that the growth path of the economy depends on the size of 
the externalities generated by capital and labor. This is not surprising. It 
is the basis for much of the analysis of the new growth theory.The emphasis of 
this paper has been on the effects of the distribution of the rents generated 
by the externality. 
We have constructed an extremely simple example economy with an 
investment externality typical of those in the new growth literature. We see 
that as a lower fraction of the rents are captured by workers, and more by 
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firm-owners, that current consumption will be greater, and saving will be 
lower. The growth rate will be lower and long-run output and consumption are 
lower. 
In the economy we study, a policy of subsidizing capital will lead to a 
Pareto improvement in welfare. But, the government may also be interested in 
distributional policies which allow it to increase the value of social 
welfare. The fiscal policies that are chosen to achieve some desired 
intergenerational distribution of income or growth rate should depend on the 
distribution of rents. 
The empirical importance of the distribution effects is an open issue. 
It should be possible to detect differences in the growth rates of economies 
that have different rent distributions, but we leave that to future research. 
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